27 Jul 2026

Juridical Engagement With Electoral Reservations in India, Big Ideas Ep 77

Sidharth Chauhan examines how Dr. Ambedkar's ideas can justify electoral reservations for caste, gender, and disability across different levels of Indian government

VIDEO BY

Sidharth Chauhan

Dr Sidharth Chauhan is an Assistant Professor of Law at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU). He holds an LL.M. from the University of Pennsylvania and earned his Ph.D. from NALSAR, Hyderabad. His research and teaching interests lie primarily in Indian Constitutional Law, Legal Philosophy, and Comparative Public Law. His publications can be found here [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1151556].

Abstract

Reservation law in India has largely been studied through the lens of education and employment, leaving electoral reservations relatively unexamined by courts and scholars. Prof. Sidharth Chauhan, who recently completed his PhD at NALSAR University, argues that this gap matters. His thesis builds a case for electoral reservations at the parliamentary, state legislature, and local body levels by returning to Dr Ambedkar's ideas while grappling with frameworks courts have already developed for education and jobs.

The conversation moves through the constitutional architecture of reservations, the recurring critique of proxy candidature in reserved seats, the question of whether reservations should be judged by measurable outcomes, and whether winning a ticket actually translates into holding real power. Along the way, Dr Sidharth draws on empirical work from development economics and political science, and repeatedly returns to a central distinction: electoral representation cannot be evaluated using the same yardstick as material or economic outcomes, because political representation is tied to the identity of a country itself.

The notes below trace this argument chapter by chapter, from the specific constitutional articles involved to Sidharth's closing case for calling reservations "compensatory discrimination" rather than "protective discrimination."

Citation

Chauhan, Sidharth, and Gokul Sunoj. "Juridical Engagement With Electoral Reservations in India." Episode 77 of Big Ideas. XKDR Forum, 27th July 2026. Video, 8:19. https://www.xkdr.org/viewpoints/juridical-engagement-with-electoral-reservations-in-india-big-ideas-ep-77

Key Insights

Electoral reservations in the Indian constitution appear in different provisions from educational and employment reservations. Article 15(4) covers educational reservations, Article 16(4) covers employment reservations, and both sit in the fundamental rights chapter. Electoral reservations instead appear in Article 330 (Lok Sabha), Article 332 (Vidhan Sabha), and Articles 243D and 243T (local government), making them analytically distinct.
Courts have focused far more on interpreting the meaning and scope of educational and employment reservation provisions than on electoral reservation provisions.
The problem of proxy representation, where family members effectively make decisions on behalf of an elected woman or Dalit/Adivasi candidate, is real but should be understood as only "a small slice of the problem."
Electoral quotas serve an "incubation function": even when a husband dominates decision-making after his wife becomes a sarpanch, the arrangement still builds confidence and creates a pathway for others to eventually learn leadership through experience.
Statistic/finding: empirical work in development economics shows that more than thirty years of gender-based reservations in some states are now producing positive, intergenerational outcomes.
Scholars such as Marc Galanter and political scientist Narendra Kumar have documented similar long-term effects of reservations for Dalits and Adivasis in Parliament and state legislatures.
Promotional reservations were only formally added to the constitution in 1995 through Article 16(4A), following the Indira Sawhney case, where courts had been reluctant to extend reservations to the promotion stage. This constitutional change responded to evidence that the proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe employees reaching departmental promotions or senior positions was marginal.
Before Article 16(4A) existed, several state governments had already amended civil service rules to apply reservations at the promotion stage, as early as the 1970s. The case of NM Thomas versus State of Kerala upheld a policy enabling such promotional reservations.
Sidharth's normative argument: material or economic outcome measures, useful for evaluating employment reservations, should not be applied in the same way to electoral reservations, because political representation is prior to compensatory discrimination measures addressing inequality in employment or education.
Reservations for tickets do not automatically translate into representation in actual positions of power; this needs to be studied through effects on party politics, such as parties diversifying ticket distribution or caste- and region-based parties mobilizing more effectively around reserved constituencies.
Reservations should be evaluated not only by counting elected representatives, but by their effect on candidate selection, campaigning strategy, and which constituencies parties choose to appeal to.
Colonial-era reservations in education, employment, and electoral government were primarily designed to maintain law and order and prevent disorder among communities seen as distinct from one another. Sidharth argues this colonial justification cannot carry forward into how the Indian constitution is interpreted or enforced today.
Following Marc Galanter, Sidharth argues Indian reservation law should be framed as "compensatory discrimination" rather than "protective discrimination," and that its evidence of success may need to be judged not in five, ten, or twenty years, but over a much longer horizon.

Notes

Why electoral reservations need their own justification

Sidharth opens by identifying a specific gap in Indian reservation scholarship. Courts, he says, have spent most of their interpretive energy on educational and employment reservations, while electoral reservations have received comparatively little sustained attention. His PhD thesis, submitted at NALSAR University, sets out to fill that gap by returning to Dr. Ambedkar's writings and reading them contextually, using them to build justifications for electoral reservations that apply across Parliament, state legislatures, and local government bodies.

Importantly, Sidharth frames his own contribution as also useful for present-day debates that go beyond caste and tribal identity. The same Ambedkarite reasoning, he suggests, can help navigate newer and more contested proposals for progressive electoral reservations based on gender and disability.

"The main argument there is that when it comes to reservation law under the Indian constitution, our courts have by and large focused on educational reservations and employment reservations, but not so much on the justification for electoral reservations."

Mapping the constitutional provisions

Asked to walk through the relevant legal instruments, Sidharth distinguishes carefully between different constitutional articles. Educational reservations trace back to Article 15(4), added by the First Amendment. Employment reservations for backward classes were part of the original constitutional text, under Article 16(4).

Because these two articles sit within the fundamental rights chapter, Sidharth treats them as "analytically different" from electoral reservations, which appear in a separate set of provisions: Article 330 for reservations in the Lok Sabha, Article 332 for reservations in the Vidhan Sabha, and, more recently, Articles 243D and 243T covering local government. His thesis does not focus on the drafting history of these provisions but on how courts have interpreted their meaning and scope over time.

Proxy candidature and the incubation function of quotas

Gokul raises a well-known critique of gender-based reservations: women are sometimes pushed to stand for office as proxies, with husbands or brothers effectively wielding the real decision-making power once elected. Sidharth acknowledges this is a longstanding concern, one historically raised about scheduled caste candidates and still raised today about scheduled tribe candidates in reserved constituencies. But he argues that proxy representation, while a genuine issue, is only "a small slice of the problem."

His response centers on what he calls the incubation function of electoral quotas.

"Even if husbands are dominating their wives and actually making decisions on their behalf when somebody becomes a sarpanch, it also incubates the confidence or the possibility for others to then follow the same route and then learn leadership through experience over time."

To support this, Sidharth points to empirical work in development economics showing that after thirty-plus years of gender-based reservations in some Indian states, the outcomes are now positive and intergenerational. He also connects this to older scholarship, citing Marc Galanter and political scientist Narendra Kumar, who have studied similar long-run effects for Dalit and Adivasi representation in Parliament and state legislatures. The overall message is that the social effect of the policy needs to be assessed over time, not judged by isolated instances of proxy control, and that the long-term evidence, in his view, is "very positive."

Promotional reservations and the limits of impact measurement

The conversation turns to a broader critique often leveled at reservation policy: the lack of impact measurement, an issue that came up prominently in debates over reservations in promotions within public employment. Sidharth traces the constitutional history here in detail.

Promotional reservations were given explicit constitutional footing only in 1995, through the addition of Article 16(4A), following discussions in the Indira Sawhney case where courts had resisted extending reservations to the promotion stage. This amendment responded to evidence that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe representation in higher civil service positions and departmental promotions remained marginal. Sidharth notes, however, that several state governments had already amended their civil service rules to apply reservations at the promotion stage as far back as the 1970s, and cites the case of NM Thomas versus State of Kerala, where the government's policy enabling promotional reservations was upheld.

On the underlying question of impact measurement, Sidharth draws a sharp line between domains. He accepts that economic analysis reasonably links employee performance in public sector organizations to concerns about efficiency, and that similar material outcome measures can be useful, to some extent, in evaluating the long-term impact of employment reservations. But he resists applying that same frame to electoral reservations.

"While material outcomes or evidence of economic success may be useful to some extent when we evaluate the long-term impact of employment reservations, I don't think personally that the same frame should be applied to electoral reservation. And the key idea is that political representation is prior to compensatory discrimination measures that may address inequality in unemployment or education, because political representation is tied to the identity of a country."

From tickets to real power

Gokul pushes on a further practical concern: does winning a reserved ticket actually translate into holding real positions of power, given that government functions through ministries and departments? Sidharth points to related empirical work, citing Norwegian scholar Francesca Jensenius, who has studied the impact of scheduled caste reservations at state legislative assemblies. He is careful to note that his own thesis concentrates more on court opinions and the gaps in judicial reasoning in this area, rather than on this kind of empirical political science.

Still, he sketches out some of the downstream effects reservations can have on party politics. Reservations may compel parties that were previously dominated by particular castes to diversify their ticket distribution practices. In other cases, reserved constituencies have allowed parties organized around specific caste or regional identities to mobilize more effectively. Sidharth frames these as both "upstream and downstream effects" that go well beyond simply counting how many reserved representatives enter an elected body.

"I don't think we should evaluate it just in terms of counting the number of representatives that enter parliament or elected body. There is certainly evidence to be gathered on the effect it has on choice of candidates, the campaigning process, and also the constituencies to whom you will appeal to."

From colonial law and order to constitutional transformation

In his concluding remarks, Sidharth situates the entire discussion within a larger historical argument. When the colonial state first introduced reservations across higher education, employment, and electoral government, the underlying motivation, in his reading, was primarily about maintaining law and order and preventing disorder among communities that were treated as distinct from one another.

Sidharth argues that this colonial justification cannot simply be carried forward into how reservations are interpreted or enforced under the Indian constitution today. If social reform and social transformation are central goals of the constitution, then reservations should not be understood as material resources to be distributed, but as elements of collective moral responsibility.

This leads him back to Marc Galanter's terminology, which he endorses as the correct frame for Indian reservation law.

"Which is why once again to go back to Marc Galanter, the proper frame for Indian reservation law is not to call it protective discrimination, but to call it compensatory discrimination. And the evidence does not need to be judged in five years, ten years, or twenty years from now, but maybe in a hundred years from now."